Фодор Дж. - Концепции. Каким образом когнитивная наука пошла по неправильному пути / Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (J.Fodor)

Фодор Дж. - Концепции. Каким образом когнитивная наука пошла по неправильному пути / Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (J.Fodor)

Название: Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

Издательство: Oxford University Press, USA
Год: 1998
Страниц: 192
Формат: PDF
Размер: 1 Мб
Качество: отличное
Язык: Английский
ISBN-10: 0198236360
ISBN-13: 978-0198236368

`Fodor continues to be one of philosophy`s great idea generators. This provocative book will set the agenda for discussion about concepts for years to come. Fodor argues for atomism about concepts with wit, verve and style. Everyone interested in philosophical issues of language or mind should study this book.`
                                                     Ned Block, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, New York University

`a rich account of what a science of the mind might look like if concepts had no structure ... a daunting critique of much of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Like most of Fodor`s work, this book is bound to infuriate some and delight others. Either way it is full of interesting arguments, and as Fodor`s most comprehensive overview of his philosophical position in years, his new book deserves to be - and surely will be - widely read.` 
                                                                                   British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 50 (1999)

`immensely stimulating. Anyone working in the area will need to study its trenchant critical discussion of key positions in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology. These readers will be rewarded as well by the book`s many illuminating asides and its more constructive closing chapters.` 
                                                                                                                                          Steven Gross

`serves up plenty of clever barbs, potshots, and one-liners` - The Philosophical Review, Vol.109, No.4 

The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.

P.S. Специально для platonanet.org.ua. Ресурс выносит огромную благодарность Artyom Ukhov за предоставленный материал

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